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Coalition governments are Queensland's political past and future. 
As the three major parties prepare for the 1989 state elections, none 
of them has a strong chance of winning government in their own 
right. If no party wins the numbers to govern alone, a conservative 
coalition government seems the most likely outcome if Queensland 
is not to enter an Itahan-style era of unstable administrations, 
minority governments and frequent elections. This paper examines 
the coalition governments that ruled Queensland during the most 
tranquil decade of its recent political history — the Nicklin 
governments of 1957 to 1968. It concentrates on the relationship 
between the two conservative parties during Frank Nicklin's 
stewardship. Many times, Nicklin and his calming influence would 
prove the most important element in keeping the relationship on an 
even keel. 
When he came to power in 1957 after the Labor split, Nicklin, 
although the most senior member of the government side, had had 
no experience in government. He was elected to Parliament on the 
day in 1932 when the conservative coalition of Arthur Moore was 
defeated at the polls. But Nicklin, as well as having seen the disastrous 
results to the Labour party when it failed to suppress the discord 
within its ranks, had experienced the full frustrating and erratic 
history of coalition co-operation during a quarter of a century in 
opposition. 
The conservative coalition forged by Arthur Moore under the label 
Country-Progressive Nationalist Party (CPNP) lasted one term in 
opposition, but after they were annihilated at the polls in 1935, 
disintegration was swift. On 6 April 1936 the CPNP organisation 
formally resolved to disband. The rural and urban conservative parties 
limped along separately in opposition for a while, openly suspicious 
of each other and frequently voicing their distrust and differences 
in public' 
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In 1941 the Forgan Smith Labor government cruised to an easy 
win, winning forty-one seats to the Country Party's fourteen and 
the Umted Australia Party's four. The latter, forerunner to the 
Liberals, had made occasional overtures to the Country Party to form 
an anti-Labor coalition, but the Country Party organisation, 
somewhat unrealistically, continually refused even to enter into any 
negotiations.^ 
The Country Party members, dissatisfied and impatient, acted on 
their own initiative. Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden convened 
a secret meeting of Federal and state parliamentarians from both 
conservative parties at Parliament House in Brisbane on 27 April 
1941. An alliance that was dubbed the Country-National Party was 
formed without the prior knowledge of the party organisations, 
infuriating Country Party officials,' although the United Austraha 
Party president was both surprised and delighted." 
Fadden declared that he wished to form a "National" government 
composed of all parties to cope with the war situation, much as 
Winston Churchill had done in Britain. One Country Party official, 
Allan Campbell, sour and sceptical, wanted to know why the self-
styled architect of national political unity had not troubled to ask 
any Labor parliamentarians to the meeting.' 
A SURPRISE ELECTION 
Frank Nicklin, smiling pineapple farmer and minor war hero had 
hitherto served with dignity, if not with special distinction on the 
opposition backbenches. He was now elected unopposed to the state 
parliamentary leadership of the new alliance. The new party, divorced 
from organisational backing, had a brief life. By 1944, worried that 
the organisation could endorse — and have returned — other 
candidates, the rebellious members, including Nicklin, returned to 
the fold. His brief period of political intransigence over, Nickhn was 
now tamely content to leave the initiative for alliances to the party 
executive. A few days before the 1944 poll — and another thrashing 
for the conservatives — Nicklin said that he would agree to a 
coalition, but he stressed that any decision to form one was a matter 
for the party.* 
A formal coalition might have made it easier for opposition leader 
Nicklin to present a united front to the electorate, but he did not 
push for it. The parties co-operated at a parliamentary level on an 
informal basis and the arrangement worked reasonably well. Sir 
Thomas Hiley recalled that there were a few grumbles from the 
Country Party members because Hiley, as financial spokesman for 
the conservatives, would customarily open the opposition's reply on 
the budget, but this did not jeopardise the unofficial alliance.' 
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Seat contesting arrangements between the two parties varied from 
election to election. Sometimes elements of farce were present. In 
July 1952 the conservative challenger for the Labor seat Port Curtis 
was reported by the Country Party organisation to be "confused" 
after he was approached by both the Country Party and the Liberals 
to run under their banner. Eventually he received joint endorsement, 
and on election day, a thrashing. When the Liberals were awarded 
the right to run a candidate in the seat of Nash, based around 
Gympie, a Country Party official lamented: "We are confronted with 
the distasteful business of trying to force our people to vote for a 
Liberal, which they emphatically refuse to do." The Liberal was 
defeated.* 
Opposition leader Frank Nicklin in an uncharacteristically aggressive mood in 1949. 
John Oxley Library. 
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Despite episodes such as these, a full merger of the two 
organisations was never seriously contemplated. After the 
conservatives were customarily thrashed in the 1953 elections the 
Country Party member for Southport Eric Gaven moved the 
resolution at the next party conference that the parties merge under 
the name United Party in a bid t& reverse the trend of rapidly 
diminishing support, but the motion was defeated.^ 
John Ahern, father of the current Premier and president of the 
Country Party from 1965 to 1968 has given several reasons for the 
party's perpetual refusal to amalgamate with the Liberals. Firstly, 
the idea had been tried before and had failed. Secondly, 
amalgamation would provide grounds for the formation of breakaway 
parties composed of purist followers of both conservative 
philosophies. This happened in 1941 when four Country Party 
members refused to participate in Fadden's merger. Thirdly, the 
continued Liberal espousal of the one vote, one value principle was 
totally unacceptable to the Country Party.'" 
The Country Party also feared that its regional priorities could 
be lost in an amalgamation. Party President Harold Richter told a 
conference in 1957, a few months before the coalition victory: 
. . . the Country Party must always remain free and unfettered from 
any political arrangement which may jeopardise the balanced 
development of Australia. We must be free to fight for the stability 
and well-being of our primary industries . . . ' 
By now the conservatives were learning from the errors of the past. 
For the 1956 election, seats were allocated well in advance and 
although the coalition only won one extra seat, Nicklin reported to 
Richter that "fighting the campaign on a coordinated basis with the 
Liberal Party was definitely an advantage as it eliminated entirely 
the differences which at previous elections had proved so 
detrimental".'^ 
There is no question that the conservative parties emphasised their 
unity of purpose during the 1957 campaign. With Labor hopelessly 
divided, the tactic was a hard one to fault. The Liberals agreed to 
a joint policy speech which in itself was a model of coalition co-
operation. Nicklin delivered his part of the speech at Maroochydore 
on 1 July and Morris completed it in Brisbane the next evening. Both 
leaders promised to encourage industrial expansion and the 
development of new businesses in Queensland — time worn and 
predictable conservative platitudes. Both stressed the unity of the two 
parties as opposed to the divisions of Labor. Otherwise, the speeches 
did not overlap." 
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GOVERNMENT LEADER 
After the election the Liberals had ten new seats, but except for 
the Darling Downs seats of Lockyer and Toowoomba, they were 
confined to the Brisbane metropolitan area. With their parliamentary 
numbers more than doubled, the Liberals could feel more than 
pleased, but the Country Party had twenty-four seats, six more than 
the Liberals. It was clear who had the numbers to call the shots in 
government. 
The disparity was emphasised in 1958 when the coalition members 
hammered out a redistribution agreement. After hours of haggling, 
a bargain was struck. Four extra seats were created in the metropolitan 
area and one in the country was abolished. In return, and to their 
everlasting regret the Liberals agreed to keep the system of weighted 
zonal representation, thus ensuring that while there was a coalition 
the Country Party would always have the numbers. 
Nickhn was not the man to spurn the advantages of having the 
numbers, but he did not lean unduly on his partners either. Before 
the election the coalition parties had agreed to allocate the 
premiership to the senior party and the treasury to the junior one. 
Once six Country Party and five Liberal men had been selected by 
exhaustive ballot among the parliamentarians, Nicklin and the Liberal 
leader Ken Morris conferred and allocated the portfolios. Morris 
recalled in 1978: "Frank Nickhn and I formed this government 
without the slightest acrimony, disputation or disagreement".'" 
Morris was not always an easy man with whom to work. He was 
a hard worker, but he was ambitious and had a somewhat abrasive 
personality. Lacking a certain subtlety in his political technique, he 
once advised a group of Liberal candidates "When you see a head, 
hit it". Even so, his high regard for Nicklin cannot be doubted. The 
two men had been friends since Morris' childhood. Morris once 
recalled that he had had his father's praise of Nicklin's honesty and 
straightforwardness "dinned into me" ever since he could remember. 
Childhood sentiments aside, Nicklin was a very easy man with 
whom to work and Morris knew it. He said: "It 's not at all easy 
to quarrel with Frank Nicklin. I've never worked with anyone who 
has the knack of presenting the opposite case with so little offence. 
You have a sense of trusting him all the while."" 
Nicklin, affable and complaisant, was willing to exercise extreme 
tact with the volatile Morris. Although submissions from individual 
cabinet ministers were customarily dealt with in order of receipt, the 
wily Morris would sometimes plead an upcoming and important 
engagement elsewhere in order to have his proposals discussed first. 
Nickhn cottoned on to Morris' ploy after a while but, no doubt with 
406 
a mental shrug of his broad coalitionist shoulders, usually let his 
partner jump the queue. 
Morris made some sound contributions, but he was also capable 
of coming up with occasional harebrained proposals, some of which, 
unlike his industrial legislation that precipitated the strikes at Mt. 
Isa, did not get far in the cabinet room. When he was rebuffed, Morris 
would storm out after accusing his coUeagues of plotting against him. 
These incidents became more frequent and there was a corresponding 
decline in Morris' prestige and effectiveness. His decision to retire 
from state politics in late 1962 came as a relief to the Premier.'* 
Nicklin never complained about Morris in public — he was too much 
of a coalitionist for that. Even in retirement all he would say of 
Morris' erratic behaviour for the oral history project carried out by 
the National Library of Australia was that his colleague "was very 
impetuous and required a little bit of restraining at times"." 
Ken Morris, Liberal leader 1954-62, deputy premier 1957-1962, abrasive, ambitious 
and temperamental but nevertheless loyal to his friend, Frank Nicklin. John Oxley 
Library. 
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By all accounts, Nicklin got on well with the Liberal ministers in 
his cabinet. He had shared too many years with them in futile 
opposition to wish to quarrel. Organisational differences between the 
two parties did not readily permeate to the parliamentary sphere. The 
busy legislative programme in the early years consisted largely of 
measures that both parties held were long overdue after a quarter 
century of Labor rule, so here there was httle potential for conflict. 
AMALGAMATION REJECTED 
Nicklin's sage regulation of decision-making in cabinet was 
calculated to promote coalition unity. There was no domination of 
Cabinet by the Premier. After a submission had been discussed it 
was put to the vote. In the event that support for the measure came 
chiefly from the Liberals, that was no obstacle to its implementation 
if it was favoured by a healthy cabinet majority. Nicklin was reluctant, 
however, to proceed if the majority was slim or if there was a clear 
division along party lines within Cabinet.'* 
At the 1959 Liberal convention a motion was carried to offer the 
Country Party complete union of the two parties "on any reasonable 
terms the Country Party may nominate".'^ As usual, the offer was 
refused, but there were no hard feelings, and relations between the 
parties remained healthy. 
The relative strength of the two parties precluded the possibility 
of Nicklin governing in his own right. There is no evidence that he 
ever particularly wished to do so. In mid-1962 it was reported that 
Morris had assured Nicklin that even if the Liberals won more seats 
than the Country Party at the 1963 state election Nicklin would still 
remain Premier.^" Of course, whether Morris, whose personal 
prestige within his party had declined significantly, was in a position 
to guarantee unconditional support of the Liberals to Nicklin is 
another matter, as indeed is the matter of whether he would have 
been able to resist taking over the premiership himself. Still, the fact 
that such assurances could be made, or at least soberly reported, 
testifies to the cordial relations between the two leaders. 
On 12 July 1962 the parties each agreed to contest thirty-six seats 
in the 1963 election, basing their allocations on the distribution of 
candidates in 1960. By now, a few clouds had gathered around the 
Liberal expansionism into traditional Country Party areas. 
From the late 1950s onwards the Liberals had been discreetly 
organising on the Gold Coast and the Redcliffe peninsula. Both were 
safe areas for the Country Party, but the demography of these regions 
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was changing. Rapid population increases, mostly in the form of 
wealthy urban retirees, had turned the coastal centres from something 
akin to large country towns to sizeable urban centres, providing the 
Liberals with a natural power base from which to operate. In 
retrospect, it was inevitable that these regions would become the first 
flashpoints for intra-coalition jealousy. 
In the electorate of Redcliffe the independent member, Jim 
Houghton accepted an offer to join the Liberals. But under the 
coalition agreement, Redcliffe was Country Party turf. The Country 
Party insisted that Houghton was not a member of the coalition 
government, and they refused to allow him to attend joint party 
meeting. 
For a few days the Country Party held a gun at the Liberals' hapless 
heads. The Liberals blinked first and decided that Houghton, while 
he could remain a member of the Redcliffe branch of the Liberal 
party, had to sit in Parliament as an independent. If the arrangement 
suited the Liberals, it did not suit Houghton, who said: "I am not 
going to be a member of an organisation which does not have the 
courage to stand up and fight."^' Houghton resigned from the 
Liberal Party. 
There was a twist to the Houghton affair in July 1962 when deputy 
Country Party leader Jack Pizzey approached Houghton and asked 
him to join the Country Party. Houghton agreed, upsetting the 
Liberals who regarded Redcliffe as a suburb of Brisbane and thus 
natural Liberal territory, but after their lack of support for Houghton 
as a Liberal they were hardly in a moral position to criticise him.^ ^ 
But like good coalition partners they agreed to aid the Country Party 
in its efforts to have Houghton re-elected in 1963. 
The face of coalition relations was altered forever on 31 October 
1962 when, after months of haggling, both parties agreed to 
reintroduce preferential voting after a lapse of twenty years. 
The Liberals had been far keener than the Country Party to see 
preferential voting return. From 1958 to 1962 every Liberal convention 
had voted overwhelmingly in favour of it, but the Country Party 
feared, correctly, that it would provide the Liberals with the means 
and the excuse to mount three-cornered contests in seats that were 
considered Country Party territory. The deciding factor was the 
rapidly diminishing strength of the Queensland Labor Party, the 
grouping made up of members that had stayed loyal to Nicklin's 
predecessor Vince Gair, in the wake of the Labor split. 
In 1960 Gair's party had been reduced from eleven seats to four, 
while the official Labor party had increased its vote from 28.89 per 
cent in 1957 to 39.89 per cent in 1960. Neither of the coalition parties 
could boast similar increases, so it could be inferred that QLP voters 
were returning to the official Labor fold. If the trend continued, it 
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was reasoned, the coalition could well lose seats if the next election 
was run under the first past the post system. 
Gair lost his own seat in 1960, but remained president of the QLP. 
Crotchety as ever, he asserted publicly that his party might not bother 
with the 1963 election if preferential voting was not reintroduced.'^' 
The Liberals felt that better use could be made of the hardcore 
QLP vote. Liberal strategists believed that eighty-five to ninety per 
cent of the QLP preferences could be expected to favour the 
coahtion.^" 
Nicklin was characteristically cautious and diplomatic at the joint 
party meeting held to discuss the proposal. Carefully steering the 
middle course, the Premier summarised the arguments for and 
against, adding that he personally favoured the reintroduction of the 
optional preferential voting system that had existed between 1892 and 
1942. Many Country Party men were still dubious. Alan Munro, who 
had recently replaced Morris as Liberal leader assured them that the 
Liberals were not trying to make gains at their expense. Munro 
declared that he would resign from the leadership if any Liberal 
branches in the country nominated candidates against sitting Country 
Party members. 
The vote was close, and although figures were not revealed it was 
reported that several Country Party men changed their minds at the 
last minute. It was agreed to amend the Election Act. To minimise 
the effect of the minor parties, preferential voting was made 
compulsory." 
THREE-CORNERED CONTESTS 
After preferential voting was adopted, coalition relations were never 
the same again. With first past the post voting, there was little point 
in splitting the anti-Labor vote by running Liberal and Country Party 
candidates against one another. But now it could be argued that 
preferential voting maximised the anti-Labor vote if a strict exchange 
of preferences was observed. Some seats had been won in New South 
Wales and Victoria using this strategy, but in these states the Country 
Party was very much the junior partner, and had very little chance 
of ever winning more seats than the Liberals. In Queensland, the 
Liberals were never able to sell to the Country Party the assurance 
that the running of candidates against sitting Country Party members 
was aimed at increasing the anti-Labor vote and not at dislodging 
enough of them to win coalition seniority. 
The Liberals continued to be frustrated by signs that they were 
amassing strong support outside their dehneated territory. The party 
organ, the Queensland Liberal reported in February 1965 that of the 
new branches established in 1964, one third of them were outside 
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Brisbane. To many Liberals it seemed negligent not to take advantage 
of that strength. The fact that their party continually polled more 
votes, but won less seats than the Country Party only added to their 
impatience. 
Friction between the two parties was a fact of life after the Liberal 
Party State Conference in May 1964. A resolution to contest rural 
seats held by the Country Party was passed with the support of 
between eighty and ninety per cent of delegates. Charles Porter, 
Liberal party secretary, later claimed in his autobiography The gut 
feeling the credit for steering the resolution "through a resounding 
affirmation" at the conference.^* 
Nicklin was restrained in his criticism. On Meet the Press he 
reminded Queensland viewers: "It is not good politics for the Liberal 
Party to establish branches in traditional Country Party seats. The 
success of the government has been due to the close organisational 
and parliamentary co-operation of the parties."" 
Certain Liberals did not reciprocate Nicklin's restraint, and appear 
to have been eager to find any excuse to criticise the Premier. At the 
Young Liberals conference at Southport in May 1965 Ern Harley, 
a former Mayor of the Gold Coast, attacked Nicklin for urging 
Country Party members to give their preferences to Labor in the Gold 
Coast seat of Albert in the 1963 election.^* What Harley failed to 
mention was that the unusual Country Party-Labor preference deal 
was a one off arrangement aimed at saving the hide of a Country 
Party member who was running against a strong independent 
candidate — Harley himself. 
On 2 April 1965 the state Liberal president Senator R.D. 
Sherrington affirmed that the Liberals would contest some Country 
Party seats at the next election "for the benefit of the coahtion". 
Ten or twelve seats only would be contested — "a reasonable and 
moderate decision" — and the Country Party would receive the full 
allocation of preferences.^'^ 
Nicklin attacked the proposal, but remained as calm as ever. "The 
two parties should get together and work out the seats each one will 
fight — I don't believe in three-cornered elections". Keith Livingston, 
vice-president of the Young Liberals, accused Nicklin of being more 
afraid of losing coalition seniority rather than government.'" 
Nicklin certainly had more reason to fear the loss of the former 
than the latter. With a weak Labor party, a favourable redistribution, 
and the benefit of the preferences of the QLP (who by this time were 
the DLP) the coalition itself was safely ensconced in government, 
but unlike the Liberals the Country Party could take no comfort from 
changes in Queensland's demography. Rapid urbanisation on both 
the coasts was creating new ground for the Liberals, but voter 
enrolments in most Country Party seats were down. In 1965 the 
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respective party strengths stood at twenty-six for the Country Party 
and twenty for the Liberals. The Liberals thus needed to win only 
four seats from their partners to attain coalition seniority, and with 
the Liberals contesting areas where they could draw on newly-arrived 
reserves of voter strength there was no guarantee that this would not 
happen. 
Nicklin tried his best to mend the rift. On 4 July he urged the 
Country Party to promise not to contest any seat against a sitting 
Liberal if the Liberals would promise not to run a candidate in Albert. 
"Even though under severe provocation, we should still be prepared 
to make an effort to maintain the status quo."" 
The Country Party did not endorse any candidates in Liberal-held 
seats, but the Liberals contested eight seats against the Country Party 
in 1966. Three were won easily by Labor, but the campaigns in the 
five beach resort seats — Albert, Logan, South Coast, Redchffe and 
Nicklin's old seat of Murrumba — were more intense and bitter. No 
seats changed hands, but the Liberals presented a very real threat 
to the Country Party in Albert, Logan and South Coast. In the latter 
seat the Country Party candidate Russ Hinze trailed the Liberals on 
first preferences, but was elected narrowly when the Labor preferences 
favoured him by four to one. In Albert, Ern Harley tried again, this 
OIL ON TROUBLED WATERS — WILL IT WORK? 
How the Courier-Mail saw Nicklin trying to smooth things over after the Liberal 
Organisation decided to stand candidates in Country Party seats. Courier-Mail 6 
April 1965. 
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time as an endorsed Liberal candidate, but the sitting member Cec 
Carey won narrowly. In Carey's first speech to the new parliament 
in August he accused Harley of using spies during the campaign.'^ 
Writing in 1969 Colin Hughes observed that the Liberals' 
subsequent lack of enthusiasm for three-cornered contests suggested 
that the 1966 experiment was a failure." Hughes spoke too soon, 
but the experiment had not worked well. In most cases, the combined 
Country Party and Liberal vote was down from what the Country 
Party had obtained on their own in 1963. Moreover, Liberal 
preferences were not directed to the Country Party in the proportions 
for which the Liberal organisation had hoped, lending weight to the 
Country Party contention that three-cornered contests could cost the 
coalition seats. 
The 1966 campaign was Nicklin's last. The focus of intra-coalition 
conflict switched to the Legislative Assembly where the so-called 
"Ginger Group" led by Charles Porter (who entered Parliament as 
the member for Toowong in 1966) took the lead in harassing the 
Country Party. Porter, who later modified his views enough to 
become perhaps the strongest supporter of Premier Bjelke-Petersen 
among the Liberals in parliament, was at pains in 1980 to emphasise 
that the coalition conflicts of the 1960s did not involve any personal 
animosity against Nicklin. Porter declared that researchers of the 
period "will not find alleged against the late Frank Nickhn the palest 
shadow of the vituperation, abuse and charges of corrupt and 
despotic practices that have been a consistent feature of (recent) 
Liberal pronouncements".'" 
Liberal attacks on Nicklin himself were rare, but not unknown. 
In March 1967 Nicklin introduced a bih to provide for the regulation 
of chiropractors in Queensland. In normal circumstances the Liberal 
Health minister Douglas Tooth would have introduced the bill, but 
he was sceptical as to the merits of the profession. Tooth baulked 
at introducing the bill, so Nicklin introduced it himself. Reheved, 
Tooth commented: "The Premier has my complete personal loyalty, 
and I am very grateful to him for having arranged the matter in the 
way he has." 
Another Liberal, John Murray, was more strident in his criticism, 
and said: "This is an infamous proposal." He then went on to attack 
Nicklin for disregarding the wishes of a large minority in the 
combined party room, as well as the advice of the Health minister. 
Nicklin listened patiently. His reply said more about himself than 
about chiropractors or Murray. 
Murray saw fit to make a personal attack on me. 1 do not mind 
that in the least. 1 have been attacked personally by many people. 
In fact, I have been insulted by experts. 1 will give the honourable 
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member a little bit of advice on parliamentary procedure and 
Cabinet government. If he desires at any time to attain eminence 
in his own party he should forget personal recriminations against 
other members, particularly members of the party to which he 
subscribes. I should like to remind him that one of the great 
attributes that all Parliamentarians should endeavour to possess, 
particularly in a party, is loyalty to their colleagues. That is all 1 
wish to say on the subject. ' 
It was a dignified exit for the Premier, but the bill was defeated. 
Murray said of his clash with the Premier: "I do not hold any 
personal rancour against Mr. Nicklin, or any other member 
whatsoever."'* 
While Nicklin's stable temperament helped to ensure that the 
differences between the Liberal and Country Party organisations did 
not seriously affect party co-operation at the parliamentary level, 
he was aided by the fact that virtually all of the senior Liberals of 
his time were staunch coalitionists. Of the four Liberal leaders of 
Nicklin's time. Ken Morris was by far the least temperamentahy suited 
to co-operating with the Country Party, but his high regard for 
Nicklin could never be called into question. It may have also been 
fortuitous that Morris' leadership of the Liberals was closest in time 
to the unfortunate example of the Labor split. 
Alan Munro was an honest, unassuming and retiring man whose 
word was trusted by enough of the Country Party to allow preferential 
voting to be introduced. Even though the Liberal organisation later 
overrode Munro's promise that the Liberals would not endorse other 
candidates against sitting Country Party members, Munro's 
coalitionist credentials were never called into question. 
THE FINAL YEARS 
Thomas Hiley, who had previously led the Liberals from July 1949 
to August 1954, served only a few months in his second stint as Liberal 
leader. Hiley enjoyed a warm personal friendship with Nicklin, and 
his brief tenure as deputy Premier did nothing to change this. 
The last Liberal leader to work with Nicklin was Gordon Chalk. 
Chalk was particularly emphatic in his support of the coalition, and 
was always critical of the groups within the Liberal Party that were 
undermining coalition harmony. The Young Liberals were one such 
group. In January 1966 Chalk told their conference at Rockhampton 
somewhat condescendingly: "By all means have your discussions, 
but do not be too critical of the government."" Two months later, 
when under pressure to deliver a separate policy speech to Nicklin, 
he threatened to resign from the Liberal leadership rather than do 
so.'* 
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Chalk's pro-coalitionist sentiments even went as far as to oppose 
the formation of Liberal branches in some areas of his own electorate 
of Lockyer. He recalled how he valued the support of an influential 
section of the Gatton township who were members of the Country 
Party, but had helped vote him into Parliament in the absence of 
a Country Party candidate. "I continued to retain their friendship 
rather than allow the Libs, to enter the area and stir up trouble." 
Chalk was keen to see the two parties link together, but realised the 
incompatability of the two organisations." 
When Nicklin retired. Chalk used his influence with the Liberal 
executive to persuade them not to contest Nicklin's seat of 
Landsborough, but the Landsborough branch of the Liberal Party 
endorsed a candidate against the wishes of the executive. Chalk 
supported the Country Party candidate, Mike Ahern, as Ahern was 
the official candidate of the government. In his reminiscences Charles 
Porter alleged that Chalk's fear of being opposed by a Country Party 
candidate in Lockyer was in part behind his wish to see Landsborough 
uncontested by the Liberals."" 
As a coalitionist Frank Nicklin could hardly be faulted. Most 
circumstances favoured a coalition between the two conservative 
parties. The memory of the Labor split was fresh. The two parties 
were substantially in agreement on most issues. Although the Liberals 
were the junior partners, their holding of important portfolios like 
the treasury, labour and industry, and transport meant that at cabinet 
level they were on reasonably equal footing with the Country Party. 
Here Nicklin's cautious style of government came most effectively 
into play. He no doubt saved many an argument within cabinet by 
refusing to proceed if a proposal was favoured by a narrow majority, 
or if it was obvious that there was a division along party lines. 
All four Liberal leaders were men with whom Nicklin could work 
effectively. Indeed, all senior Liberals of Nicklin's time favoured the 
existing coalition arrangements, with the exception of Alex Dewar, 
Minister for Industrial Development from January 1965, who was 
touted as a possible successor to Hiley when the latter retired."' 
Dewar was the only Liberal minister to openly support three-cornered 
contests. Nicklin wisely deferred an announcement on whether the 
leaders of the government parties would deliver joint policy speeches 
in the 1966 campaign until a new Liberal leader was elected to replace 
Hiley."^ Chalk was elected leader, with Dewar as his deputy. Dewar 
was forced to resign from the cabinet in mid-1967 after allegations 
of personal misconduct were made against him. 
Nicklin was constantly aware of the need for a stable coalition. 
He knew that his ends would not be served by making provocative 
statements against the fractious elements in the Liberal Party. Some 
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would contend that Nicklin should have been a little firmer, but it 
is hard to imagine what he could have said or done to quell the aims 
of the Liberal expansionists. A less temperate leader would have been 
a distinct liability for those within the government who wished for 
the coalition to be maintained. Considering the later history of the 
coalition it is hard to argue that a sterner line from Nicklin would 
have helped much. Neither his soft answers, nor the later (and firmer) 
answers of Premier Bjelke-Petersen served to placate those who were 
willing to risk their own political destruction. 
Never far from Nicklin's mind were the twenty-five years in 
opposition and the accident of history that had ended them. While 
opening the last Country Party conference that he attended as Premier 
he counselled delegates: 
Let us not make the same mistake as our SociaHst opponents made 
a decade ago. We should let the troubles of our Labor opponent 
serve as a reminder of the disastrous results that follow disunity 
in a government's ranks. It would be a great mistake to imagine 
that we could indulge in a struggle for party supremacy within the 
coalition and escape the severe censure of the electors."' 
Nicklin's words were proved correct — for the Liberals — sixteen 
years later, in the watershed election of 1983. For the National Party 
they remain a warning of events that may yet come to pass. 
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